

Theories of Debate, Proof and Counter-Proof in the Early Indian Dialectical Tradition

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In the *Vimāna-sthāna* of the *Caraka-saṁhitā*¹ we find—in addition to other philosophically interesting passages of this famous medical compendium, which have been dealt with by various scholars²—a whole chapter dealing with various modes of learning and teaching. Here we come across a section discussing the method of debate (*sambhāṣā-vidhi*) which is well known to historiographers of Indian logic and dialectic.³

According to this passage, debates or discussions are divided into friendly and hostile debates.⁴ The friendly debate (*sāṁdhāya-sambhāṣā*, or *anuloma-sambhāṣā*)⁵ is carried out by learned and eloquent fellow scholars who pleasantly discuss questions or problems of their science in the spirit of co-operation, and who interrogate and answer confidently without fear of being defeated.⁶ Standing in contrast to such friendly dialogues, the hostile debate (*vigṛhya-sambhāṣā*) is carried out in the spirit of opposition. The obvious aim of such a dispute is to defeat the opponent and to win the day.

The *Caraka-saṁhitā* gives an elaborate description⁷ of what a debater must take into consideration before he agrees to enter a hostile debate. Remarkably interesting,

¹ CarS vim 8.

² Cf. e.g. (in alphabetical order): BEDEKAR (1957), COMBA (1987), FILLIOZAT (1990), FILLIOZAT (1993), KATSURA (1986), MEINDERSMA (1989), MEINDERSMA (1992), MIYASAKA (1963), RAO (1962), SASTRI (1952) and SHARMA (1984).

³ Cf. e.g. VIDYĀBHŪṢAṆA (1920: 28–31), DASGUPTA (1922: 378 f.), SOLOMON (1976: 74–78), FRAUWALLNER (1984: 67–71), MATILAL (1987: 55 f.) and MATILAL (1998: 38–41).

⁴ CarS vim 8.15 f.

⁵ Cf. OBERHAMMER–PRETS–PRANDSTETTER (1991: I, 61).

⁶ CarS vim 8.17.

⁷ Cf. CarS vim 8.18–25. This passage has already been translated as early as 1872 by Rudolf von ROTH, cf. ROTH (1872). Recently this passage has been dealt with carefully according to its importance by KANG (1998).

this description is unique in the history of the Indian dialectical tradition, giving a lively picture of various types of debaters (*vādin*) and juries (*pariṣad*), which sounds like a guide to modern public political panel or TV discussions. Accordingly, the debater must examine his opponent, the opponent's personal and intellectual strengths or weaknesses which might be superior, equal or inferior to those of his own, and must also examine the jury's level of knowledge, which is described as either learned (*jñānavat*) or ignorant (*mūḍha*), and which may have a friendly (*suhṛd*), indifferent (*udāsīna*) or hostile (*pratiniviṣṭa*) attitude towards the debater.

According to this passage, a debater should enter a debate only if the opponent is equal or inferior, and only in the presence of a friendly or, at the very least, an ignorant or indifferent jury. No discussions should be carried out in the presence of a hostile jury or with a superior opponent. After having considered the weak points of his enemy in the course of debate, he should overpower him quickly:

‘Under these circumstances the following [procedures] are ways of quickly defeating inferior [opponents]: He should overpower an unlearned [opponent] by long citations of *sūtras*; moreover, [he should overpower] an [opponent] who is weak in theoretical knowledge by [the use] of sentences containing troublesome words; an [opponent] who is unable to retain sentences, by a continuous series of sentences composed of long-strung *sūtras*; an [opponent] devoid of presence of mind, by the repetition of the same [words] with a difference in meaning; an [opponent] devoid of eloquence, by pointing to half-uttered sentences; an [opponent] devoid of self-confidence, by embarrassing [him]; an [opponent] of irritable temper, by putting [him] to exertion; one who is frightened, by terrifying [him]; [and] an inattentive [opponent], by reprehending him. In these ways he should overpower an inferior opponent quickly.’⁸

Over and above that, he should take the jury into his confidence before entering such a debate, influencing it to name that with which he is familiar or that which could present great difficulties to the opponent as the subject of the debate and, at

⁸ CarS vim 8.21: *tatra khalv ime pratyavarāṇām āsuni-grahe bhavanti upāyāḥ. tad yathā—śruta-hīnam mahatā sūtra-pāṭhenābhibhavet, vijñāna-hīnam punaḥ kaṣṭa-śabdena vākyena, vākya-dhāraṇa-hīnam aviddha-dīrgha-sūtra-saṅkulair vākya-daṇḍakaiḥ, pratibhā-hīnam punar-vacanenāka-vidhenānekārtha-vācinā, vacana-śakti-hīnam ardhôktasya vākyaśakṣeṇa, aviśāradam apatrapaṇena, kopanam āyāsanena, bhīrum vitrāsanena, anavahitam niyamanenēti. evam etair upāyaiḥ param avaram abhibhavec chīghram <CarS₂ om. chīghram>.*

the beginning of the debate, he should pretend that the jury will set the subject and the rules of debate independently.

After this literary exposition, the *Caraka-saṃhitā* continues with the enumeration and definition of forty-four topics of the course of debate (*vāda-mārga-pada*)⁹ which should be known to debating physicians.¹⁰ It is remarkable that this section, in contrast to the passage previously mentioned, no longer speaks of hostile or friendly discussions, but only of the formal debate (*vāda*) as such. Moreover, it is not a description of situations within a debate, but a compendium of definitions and examples which forms a homogenous whole. It is most likely that it represents the oldest version of a manual on Indian dialectic and logic transmitted to us, comparable to the ancient *vāda*-manual which may be reconstructed out of the first and last chapters of the *Nyāya-sūtras*.¹¹ Caraka's manual deals with the same topics to a certain extent, but apparently in a less systematic manner than that which is found in the *Nyāya-sūtras*.¹²

⁹ Cf. CarS vim 8.27: *imāni tu* <CarS_{1,2} om. *tu*> *khalu padāni bhiṣag-vāda-mārga-jñānārtham* <CarS_{1,2} om. *bhiṣag*> *adhigamyāni bhavanti; tad yathā vādaḥ, dravyam, guṇāḥ, karma, sāmānyam, viśeṣaḥ, samavāyāḥ, pratijñā, sthāpanā, pratiṣṭhāpanā, hetuḥ, dṛṣṭāntaḥ, upanayaḥ, nigamanam, uttaram, siddhāntaḥ, śabdaḥ, pratyakṣam, anumānam, aitihyam, aupamyam, saṃśayaḥ, prayojanam, savyabhicāram, jijñāsā, vyavasāyāḥ, artha-prāptiḥ, sambhavaḥ, anujoyam, ananujoyam, anuyogaḥ, pratyanyogaḥ, vākya-doṣaḥ, vākya-praśamsā, chalam, ahetuḥ, atīta-kālam, upāmbhaḥ, parihāraḥ, pratijñā-hāniḥ, abhyanuñā, hetv-antaram, arthāntaram, nigrāha-sthānam iti*. It should be mentioned that there exists another version of this list (cf. e.g. CarS₂ 357b,3 ff.) which enumerates *dṛṣṭānta* not between *hetu* and *upanaya*, but between *uttara* and *siddhānta*. This reading is also supported by the manuscripts of the *Caraka-saṃhitā* which I have inspected. All the editions and manuscripts with this reading also differ from CarS and CarS₁ with regard to the formulation of *dṛṣṭānta* and *upanaya* in the presentation of *sthāpanā* and *pratiṣṭhāpanā* (v. fn. 31 and 34). To decide which reading may be the genuine one, Cakrapāṇidatta's commentary is of no help since he comments only marginally on these passages (cf. ĀDī 266b,25–28, 267a,18–21 and 28–34).

¹⁰ CarS vim 8.27–65.

¹¹ The idea that these two books as a whole form the basis of the original manual of debate is supported e.g. by RUBEN (1928: 218, fn. 291); TUCCI (1929: xxvii f.); RANDLE (1930: 342 f.); FRAUWALLNER (1956: 321, fn. 78); OBERHAMMER (1963: 70) etc. Recently it has been shown by a text-critical study (cf. MEUTHRATH (1996: 232 ff.)) that it is rather book 1.1 and 1.2 with the addition of book 5.2, which form a reconstructible unit, whereas book 5.1 most probably is a later insertion.

¹² Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1984: 71).

In a cursory glance, the forty-four technical terms of this manual seem to be an arbitrary compilation, but on closer inspection they show a certain structure: The central notion, the debate (*vāda*), is discussed first. It is of two kinds, namely disputation (*jalpa*) and eristic wrangle (*vitandā*). This is followed by the six Vaiśeṣika categories: substance (*dravya*), attribute (*guṇa*), movement (*karman*), universal (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*). Caraka then proceeds with the proposition (*pratijñā*), the description of proof (*sthāpanā*) and counter-proof (*pratiṣṭhāpanā*) as well as the members of the proof, i.e. reason (*hetu*), example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*), application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*). The following technical term, the ‘rejoinder’ (*uttara*),¹³ is also related to the proof, since its definition hints at a close similarity to the Nyāya-category *jāti*, the so-called ‘unsound rejoinder’.¹⁴

¹³ Cf. CarS vim 8.36: ‘A rejoinder (*uttara*) is a statement by means of dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*) when the argument (*hetu*) is brought forward by means of similarity (*sādharmya*), or a statement by means of similarity when the argument is brought forward by means of dissimilarity ... This is a rejoinder with reversal [of arguments].’—*uttaram nāma sādharṃyōpadiṣṭe* <CarS_{1,2} vā> *hetau vaidharmya-vacanaṃ, vaidharṃyōpadiṣṭe vā hetau* <CarS₂ om. *hetau*> *sādharṃya-vacanam ... etat saviparyayam uttaram.*

¹⁴ Cf. NSū 1.2.18: ‘An unsound rejoinder (*jāti*) is an objection (*pratyavasthāna*) by means of similarity (*sādharmya*) and dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*).’—*sādharmya-vaidharṃyābhyāṃ pratyavasthānaṃ jātiḥ*. I will discuss the question as to whether NSū 1.2.18 understands this kind of rejoinder as being ‘unsound’ or not, in a forthcoming paper. The explanation of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*’s commentary on this *Sūtra* supports at least the close similarity of the concept of *jāti* and that of Caraka’s *uttara*: ‘The directly following consequence (*prasaṅga*), which arises when an argument (*hetu*) has been brought forward [in a debate], that is the *jāti*. And this “directly following consequence” is an objection (*pratyavasthāna*), [i.e.] a rejection (*upālambha*), a refutation (*pratiṣedha*) by means of similarity or dissimilarity. [In the case that according to NSū 1.1.34] the reason (*hetu*) [put forward] is that which proves the [property] to be proven because of its similarity to the example (*udāharaṇa*), [the *jāti*] is the objection to this [reason] by means of its dissimilarity to the exemplification. [In the case that according to NSū 1.1.35] the reason [put forward] is that which proves the [property] to be proven [in the instance to be proven] because of its dissimilarity to the example, [the *jāti*] is the objection to this [reason] by means of its similarity to the exemplification. That [objection] which comes into existence, because it stands in opposition [to the argument], is the *jāti*.’—*prayukte hi hetau yaḥ prasaṅgo jāyate sā* <NBh₁; *sa* NBh> *jātiḥ. sa ca prasaṅgaḥ sādharṃya-vaidharṃyābhyāṃ pratyavasthānam upālambhaḥ pratiṣedha iti. udāharaṇa-sādharṃyāt sādhyā-sādhanam hetur ity asyōdāharaṇa-vaidharṃyeṇa pratyavasthānam, udāharaṇa-vaidharṃyāt <tathā udā° NBh₁> sādhyā-sādhanam hetur ity asyōdāharaṇa-sādharṃyeṇa pratyavasthānam. pratyānika-bhāvāj jāyamāno ’rtho jātir iti.* (NBh 401,8–402,5).

Subsequently the four kinds of established doctrines (*siddhānta*)¹⁵ are discussed. Then follows a group of items which is introduced with the discussion of the meaning of ‘word’ (*śabda*), followed by the four accepted means of cognition (*upalabdhi-kāraṇa*)¹⁶, namely perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*aitihya*) and comparison (*aupamya*), and subsequently deals with terms which are somehow connected with cognition in a broader sense, namely doubt (*saṁśaya*), purpose (*prayojana*), inconclusiveness (*savyabhicāra*), inquiry (*jijñāsā*), ascertainment (*vyavasāya*), implication (*artha-prāpti*), and cause of origination (*sambhava*). The remaining sixteen terms are all of a purely dialectic nature, including—apart from general notions of conversation¹⁷—the defects and excellences of statement (*vākya-doṣa*)¹⁸ and *vākya-prasāmsā*¹⁹, equivocation (*chala*)²⁰, fallacious reasons (*ahetu*)²¹ and the points of defeat (*nigraha-sthāna*)²².

¹⁵ As in the *Nyāya-sūtras* (cf. NSū 1.1.26–31), Caraka supports four kinds of *siddhānta*, namely *sarva-tantra-siddhānta*, *pratitantra-siddhānta*, *adhikaraṇa-siddhānta* and *abhyupagama-siddhānta* (cf. CarS vim 8.37).

¹⁶ Cf. CarS vim 8.33, in which the reason (*hetu*) is defined as the means of cognition: *hetur nāmōpalabdhi-kāraṇam, tat pratyakṣam anumānam aitihiyam aupamyaṃ iti. ebhis hetubhir yad upalabhyate, tat tattvam*. In this context it should be mentioned that in the *Sūtra-sthāna* of the *Caraka-saṁhitā* another set of four means of cognition (*pramāṇam*; cf. CarS sū 11.33) are taught as the four means of investigation (*parikṣā*; cf. CarS sū 11.17: *dvividham eva khalu sarvaṃ sac cāsac ca. tasya catur-vidhā parikṣā—āptōpadeśaḥ pratyakṣam anumānam yuktiś ceti*. Cf. OBERHAMMER–PRETS–PRANDSTETTER (1996: II, 161 f.).

¹⁷ Cf. such notions as *anuyojya* (‘That which is to be objected / to be specified’; cf. CarS vim 8.50), *ananuyojya* (‘That which is not to be objected’; cf. CarS vim 8.51), *anuyoga* (‘Question’; cf. CarS vim 8.52), *pratyanyoga* (‘Counter-question’; cf. CarS vim 8.53), *upāmbha* (‘Rejection of an argument’; cf. CarS vim 8.59) and *parihāra* (‘Confutation of a rejection’; cf. CarS vim 8.60) in OBERHAMMER–PRETS–PRANDSTETTER (1991, 1996: I, II) s.v.

¹⁸ The defects of statement (*vākya-doṣa*; cf. CarS vim 8.54) in a debate, all of which are understood as points of defeat (*nigraha-sthāna*), are the following: an insufficient statement (*nyūna*), a superfluous statement (*adhika*), a senseless statement (*anarthaka*), a meaningless statement (*apārthaka*) and a contradictory statement (*viruddha*). Cf. OBERHAMMER–PRETS–PRANDSTETTER (1991, 1996: I, II) s.v.

¹⁹ The excellences of statement (*vākya-prasāmsā*; cf. CarS vim 8.55) consist of the negation of the *vākya-doṣas* with the addition of one more excellency: the statements should be sufficient (*anyūna*), not superfluous (*anadhika*), senseful (*arthavat*), meaningful (*anapārthaka*), not contradictory (*aviruddha*) and the statement should be to the point (*adhigata-padārtha*).

This compilation obviously reminds one of the main sixteen categories (*padārtha*) of the *Nyāya-sūtras*,²³ despite some terminological differences and divergent interpretations of the various topics. Both manuals discuss the question of the debate in general (*vāda*, *jalpa*, *viṭaṇḍā*) with the difference that *vāda* in the *Nyāya-sūtras* is understood as the friendly form of debate,²⁴ and disputation (*jalpa*) and eristic wrangle (*viṭaṇḍā*)²⁵ are the hostile forms, whereas in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* disputation and eristic wrangle are subdivisions of *vāda*:

²⁰ According to the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, equivocation is of two kinds (cf. CarS vim 8.56): verbal equivocation (*vāk-chala*) and generalising equivocation (*sāmānya-cchala*).

²¹ The CarS supports three fallacious reasons (*ahetu*; cf. CarS vim 8.57: *ahetur nāma prakaraṇa-samaḥ, saṃśaya-samaḥ, varṇya-samaś cēti.*), which seem to be understood as fallacious forms of substantiations in a broader sense, not in the strict sense of the fallacies of the logical reason (*hetv-ābhāsa*) which were supported by later logical traditions.

²² The enumeration of the points of defeat (*nigraha-sthāna*) is somewhat non-homogenous and consists of a literal description of three censurable faults (1. the debater does not comprehend an argument even when it has been stated three times, 2. censuring a statement which is not to be censured, and 3. not censuring a statement which is to be censured), the enumeration of the defects of statement (*vākya-doṣa*), fallacious reasons (*ahetu*, without mentioning its subdivisions) and five faults which were already discussed as individual topics of debate, namely to mistime a statement (*atīta-kāla*; CarS vim 8.58), to abandon the proposition (*pratijñā-hāni*; CarS vim 8.61), concession of something undesired (*abhyanuññā*; CarS vim 8.62), change of reason (*hetv-antara*; CarS vim 8.63) and change of subject (*arthāntara*; CarS vim 8.64). Cf. CarS vim 8.65: *nigraha-sthānam nāma parājaya-prāptiḥ. tac ca trīr abhihitasya vākyaśyāparijñānam <vākyaśyāvijñānam CarS_{1,2}> pariśadi vijñānavatyām, yad vā ananuyojyasyānuyogo 'nuyojyasya cānanuyogaḥ. pratijñā-hāniḥ, abhyanuññā, kālātītavacanam (scil. atīta-kālam), ahetuḥ, nyūnam, adhikam <atiriktam CarS_{1,2}>, vyartham (scil. apārthakam), anarthakam, punar-uktam, viruddham, hetv-antaram, arthāntaram ca <CarS₂ om. ca> nigraha-sthānam.*

²³ NSū 1.1.1: *pramāṇa-prameya-saṃśaya-prayojana-dṛṣṭānta-siddhāntāvayava-tarka-nirṇaya-vāda-jalpa-viṭaṇḍāhetv-ābhāsa-cchala-jāti-nigraha-sthānānām tattva-jñānān niḥśreyasādhiḡamaḥ.*

²⁴ Cf. NSū 1.2.1: 'A [friendly] debate (*vāda*) is [carried out by the opponents] taking up the thesis (*pakṣa*) and the counter-thesis (*pratipakṣa*), [both of] which contain the five members of proof (*avayava*), are not contradictory to the [respective] doctrines (*siddhānta*) and consist of the proving (*sādhana*) [of their respective thesis] and the refuting (*upālambha*) [of the counter-thesis] based upon the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and reasoning (*tarka*).'*—pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanōpālambhaḥ siddhāntāviruddhaḥ pañcāvayavōpapannaḥ pakṣa-pratipakṣa-parigraho vādaḥ.*

²⁵ Cf. NSū 1.2.2 f: 'Disputation (*jalpa*) consists of [the same attributes] as mentioned [in the definition of the friendly debate (*vāda*) and is carried out] by proving and refuting with

‘A debate (*vāda*) is when one [disputant] discusses with an opponent in a hostile way, with a doctrine presupposed. In short, this is of two kinds: disputation (*jalpa*) and eristic wrangle (*vitaṇḍā*) In the following manner: The position of one [disputant] is that rebirth exists, [the position] of the other is that it does not exist. Both disputants substantiate their respective position by reasons [and] present the [respective] opposite position [for discussion]. This is disputation (*jalpa*) Eristic wrangle consists exclusively of pointing out the faults with regard to the opposite position’²⁶

This means that in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, *vāda* is only the hostile variety of debate.

Both manuals also list, with one small terminological divergence,²⁷ the same members of the proof. Nevertheless, one central point of their interpretation is differing, a fact to which historiographers have paid too little attention: Unexpectedly, the *Nyāya-sūtras* do not have a *terminus technicus* as an independent category for that which one would call ‘proof’ or ‘establishing the thesis’. The five individual members of the proof are merely listed under the topic ‘members’ (*avayava*)²⁸ and are defined without any hint of a generic category.

In contrast, the manual of the *Caraka-saṃhitā* shows a different and clearly structured concept. The proposition (*pratijñā*), defined nearly identically in both works, is not a constituent of the proof and is listed as an independent topic of debate (*vāda-mārga-pada*): ‘The proposition is the communication of the [object] to be proven. As for example: “The *puruṣa* is eternal”.’²⁹ Apart from the proposition,

[the addition] of equivocation (*chala*), unsound rejoinders (*jāti*) and points of defeat (*nigraha-sthāna*). A [disputation] without the establishment (*sthāpanā*) of the counter-thesis is an eristic wrangle (*vitaṇḍā*).’—*yathôktôpapannaś chala-jāti-nigraha-sthāna-sādhanaôpālambho jalpaḥ. sa pratipakṣa-sthāpanā-hīno vitaṇḍā*.

²⁶ CarS vim 8.28: *vādo nāma sa yat pareṇa <paraḥ pareṇa CarS_{1,2}> saha śāstra-pūrvakam vighya kathayati. sa ca <vādo CarS₂> dvididhaḥ saṃgrahaṇa jalpo vitaṇḍā ca ... yathā—ekasya pakṣaḥ punar-bhāvo ’stīti, nāstīty aparasya. tau ca hetubhiḥ <CarS₂; svasvahetu° CarS₁; svasvapakṣa-hetu° CarS> svasvapakṣam sthāpayataḥ parapakṣam udbhāvayataḥ. eṣa jalpaḥ ... vitaṇḍā nāma para-pakṣe doṣa-vacana-mātram eva.*

²⁷ In addition to the general example (*drṣṭānta*), which is mentioned in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* as the second member of *sthāpanā*, the *Nyāya-sūtras* have the special term *udāharaṇa*, ‘exemplification’, as the designation of the third member of proof.

²⁸ Cf. NSū 1.1.32: *pratijñā-hetūdāharaṇôpanaya-nigamanāny avayavāḥ*.

²⁹ CarS vim 8.30: *pratijñā nāma sādhyā-vacanam. yathā—nityaḥ puruṣa iti. Cf. NSū 1.1.33: sādhyā-nirdeśaḥ pratijñā*. The term *puruṣa*, literally meaning ‘human being’,

the dialectic proof or establishment (*sthāpanā*) of the proposition consists of the reason (*hetu*), the example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*), the application (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*): ‘Proof (*sthāpanā*) is the proof (or establishment) of exactly that proposition by means of reason, example, application, and conclusion. First is the proposition and then the proof. For, what can be proven when it has not been proposed?’³⁰ Subsequently Caraka gives an example of this kind of dialectic proof: ‘Proposition: the *puruṣa* is eternal; reason: because it is not produced; example: like the ether; application: and as the ether is unproduced and it is eternal, so is the *puruṣa*; conclusion: therefore it is eternal.’³¹

In accordance with this example, a proof of this kind could possibly represent the following structure: The thesis (*pratijñā*) that the *puruṣa* is eternal is given, followed by three further propositions, namely 1. that the *puruṣa* is not produced (*hetu*), 2. that an example—the ether—exemplifies both attributes, i.e. eternity and non-producedness (*dr̥ṣṭānta*), and 3. the *puruṣa* is like the example, i.e. non-produced and eternal (*upanaya*). By means of these three propositions one comes to the conclusion (*nigamana*) that the *puruṣa* is eternal. The recent book of Claus OETKE, which is an investigation of the earliest structures of the so-called Indian syllogism, offers possible logical implications and interpretations of such early types of proof.³²

We are now confronted in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* with a unique phenomenon: The dialectic proof (*sthāpanā*) is contrasted with a counterproposition propounding exactly the opposite of the thesis,³³ which is correctly established by a statement

‘man’, ‘individual soul’, ‘personal principal’, ‘supreme being’ etc. is left untranslated in this context, because it is not exactly clear which concept is meant in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*. Most probably it is to be understood as the ‘individual soul’ or the ‘personal principal’. But the question is not of real importance for the structure of the proof.

³⁰ CarS vim 8.31: *tasyā eva pratijñāyā hetu-dr̥ṣṭāntōpanaya-nigamanaiḥ sthāpanā. pūrvam hi pratijñā, paścāt sthāpanā, kim hy apratijñātam sthāpayiṣyati.*

³¹ CarS vim 8.31: *nityaḥ puruṣa iti pratijñā, hetuḥ—akṛtakatvād iti, dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ—yathākāśam iti, upanayaḥ—yathā cākṛtakam ākāśam tac ca nityam tathā puruṣa iti, nigamanam—tasmān nitya iti.* In the editions and manuscripts containing the other version of the list of the *vāda-mārga-padas* (cf. fn. 9), example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) and application (*upanaya*) are formulated in the following way: ‘example: the ether is unproduced, and it is eternal; application: and as the ether is unproduced, so is the *puruṣa*.’—*dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ—akṛtakam ākāśam tac ca nityam, upanayo—yathā cākṛtakam ākāśam tathā puruṣaḥ.* CarS₂ 358a,31–33.

³² OETKE (1994: 12 ff.).

³³ Although proof and counter-proof should be the normal opening of a debate, we do not have any further example in the transmitted texts.

which is called counter-proof (*pratiṣṭhāpanā*) in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, and which consists of another set of the same proof members:

‘Counter-proof is the proof (or establishment) of exactly the contrary of the opponent’s proposition. For example: proposition: the *puruṣa* is non-eternal; reason: because it is perceptible by the senses; example: as the pot; application: and like the pot is perceptible, and it is non-eternal, so is the [*puruṣa*]; conclusion: therefore it is non-eternal.’³⁴

Clearly this is a situation of counterbalancing arguments. But what does it imply for the interpretation of Caraka’s proof? Should one suppose that one of these two proofs is logically inconsistent? There is no hint of such an assumption. Both argumentations seem to be at least formally correct. Must we differentiate in this early stage of Indian logic between logically correct argumentations, and argumentations which claim to prove the truth of the proposal? It seems so. Due to the very sparse source material in the earliest development of Indian dialectic, one can only make conjectures. But it is highly probable that, at least for the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, the function of a proof is not to guarantee truth but to justify propositions. The truth of the conclusion and with it, the truth of the thesis, depends on the truth of the propositions, which are exemplified in the first three members of the *sthāpanā*, namely *hetu*, *drṣṭānta* and *upanaya*. It therefore reminds one of the European classical formal criterion of correctness, which does not claim the truth of a conclusion but states that if the propositions are true then the conclusion is also true. But it is not my aim to compare Indian and European logic.

Nevertheless, Caraka’s presentation of *sthāpanā* and *pratiṣṭhāpanā* seems to indicate that truth is not guaranteed by a logical proof. As for the proof in the *Nyāya-sūtras*, it is difficult to make up one’s mind. On one hand, the *Nyāya-sūtras* claim that debates are carried out by the opponents establishing opposite positions (*pakṣa* and *pratipakṣa*) within a debate, on the other hand the concepts of proof (*sthāpanā*) and counter-proof (*pratiṣṭhāpanā*) are lacking in the *Sūtras*, although the term *sthāpanā* is used once to define the eristic wrangle (*vitaṇḍā*). Of course, the

³⁴ CarS vim 8.32: *pratiṣṭhāpanā nāma yā tasyā eva* <CarS₂ om. *tasyā eva*> *para-pratijñāyā viparītārtha-sthāpanā. yathā—anityaḥ puruṣa iti pratijñā* <(viparītārtha)prati° CarS₁>; *hetuḥ—aindriyakatvād iti; drṣṭāntaḥ—yathā ghaṭa iti; upanayo—yathā ghaṭa aindriyakaḥ sa cānityaḥ, tathā cāyam iti; nigamanam—tasmād anitya iti.* The other transmitted version (cf. fn. 31) of the example (*drṣṭānta*) and the application (*upanaya*) in the *pratiṣṭhāpanā* is formulated in the following way: ‘example: the pot is perceptible by the senses, and it is non-eternal; application: and as the pot, so is the *puruṣa*.’ *drṣṭāntaḥ—ghaṭa aindriyakaḥ sa cānityaḥ; upanayo—yathā ghaṭas tathā puruṣaḥ.* CarS₂ 358b,1 f.

definitions of debate (*vāda*) and disputation (*jalpa*)³⁵ in the *Nyāya-sūtras* taken literally, according to their requirement of proving the respective thesis, must presuppose a comprehension of some kind of counter-proof as indicated in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*. But what could have been the reason not to treat the counter-proof as an independent topic of debate? Is the situation of debate so clear that there is no need to mention the counter-proof, since it consists of the same proof members anyway? Or do we have to presuppose already in the *Nyāya-sūtras* the claim that only one of the proofs of the two disputants ensures the truth of his proposition? At least in first book of the *Nyāya-sūtras* there seems to be no hint of a solution for these questions.

The fact that, at least in Caraka's presentation, truth is not guaranteed by one of the contradictory proofs, may have been the starting point of early speculations on solutions to these kinds of problems. One finds rudiments of such discussions in the chapter on unsound rejoinders (*jāti*) in the fifth book of the *Nyāya-sūtras*,³⁶ in which at least some rejoinders remind one of the situation of proof and counter-proof in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*. In the examples of the two basic kinds of rejoinders³⁷ given by the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*,³⁸ namely the 'equally [possible rejoinder] by means of similarity' (*sādharmya-sama*) and 'equally [possible rejoinder] by means of dissimilarity' (*vaidharmya-sama*), the general question is raised as to whether the reason, the example, and the application prove the object to be proven or, whether—when another set of arguments are employed—it can also prove the exact contrary.³⁹ The opponent in this discussion argues that there is no decisive reason (*viśeṣa-hetu*) for the correctness of the first argumentation as opposed to his argumentation, which

³⁵ Cf. fn. 24 and 25.

³⁶ Cf. NSū 5.1.

³⁷ Cf. the general definition of *jāti* (NSū 1.2.18) in fn. 14; cf. also TUCCI's retranslation of the Chinese translation (cf. UH_c) of the lost **Upāya-hṛdaya* in which these kinds of rejoinders are understood as valid refutations of syllogistic arguments (cf. KAJIYAMA (1991)): *eṣāṃ vimśati-vidhānāṃ sāro dvividhaḥ. vaidharmyam sādharmyaṃ ca. sajātiyatvāt sādharmyam vijātiyatvād vaidharmyam. arthasya hi tat samāśrayatvāt te vimśati-dharmān vyāpnuvataḥ* (UH 26,7–9).

³⁸ It is remarkable that exactly in the context of these rejoinders, Pakṣilasvāmin uses the term *sthāpanā* when he states in the introduction to the *Sūtras* on *sādharmya-sama* and *vaidharmya-sama* (cf. NSū 5.1.2): 'An objection by means of similarity, which differs [basically] not from the reason of the [objected] proof (*sthāpanā*), is the [unsound rejoinder called] *sādharmya-sama*.'—*sādharmyeṇa pratyavasthānam aviśiṣyamāṇam sthāpanā-hetutaḥ sādharmya-samaḥ*. NBh 2002,2 f.

³⁹ Cf. NBh 2005,6–2007,4.

would correctly prove the contrary of the former proposition.⁴⁰ Without going into the problem of unsound rejoinders here in detail, the question of the proponent of the *jāti* would indicate that his rejoinder is in no way unsound but hits the nail on the head. The notion of the correctness of proof and the justification of a thesis has shifted to the question as to whether the assumed propositions are capable of proving the object to be proven. In other words, the problem has shifted to the question of a logical relation between the proving attribute and the attribute to be proven and its applicability to the object of proof, i.e. the general justification of the three propositions *hetu*, *dr̥ṣṭānta* and *upanaya*.

⁴⁰ Another kind of *jāti* should be mentioned here because its contents concern a problem which reoccurs in Dignāga's system of logic, the *prakaraṇa-sama*. Corresponding to the example of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, it is the following situation in a debate: 'One [disputant] propounds [for example] as [his] thesis: "Sound is non-eternal because it [originates] directly preceded by an effort, like a pot." And the second [disputant] propounds the counterthesis on the basis of similarity to eternal [things]: "Sound is eternal because it is audible, like soundness".'—*anityaḥ śabdaḥ prayatnānantariyakatvād ghaṭavad ity ekaḥ pakṣam pravarttayati. dviṭīyaś ca nitya-sādharmyāt pratipakṣam pravarttayati—nityaḥ śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvāt, śabdatvavad iti.* (NBh 2027,3–5). This example is nothing but that which is called the 'contradictory non-deviating' (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*) as a special variety of an inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) reason in Buddhist logical tradition. This fallacy is expounded by Śāṅkarasvāmin in the following way: 'A *viruddhāvyabhicārin* is for instance: Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced, like a pot; sound is eternal, because it is audible, like soundness. As the two [reasons] are occasions for doubt, although they are two, they are taken together as one inconclusive [reason] (*anaikāntika*).'—*viruddhāvyabhicārī, yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavad. nityaḥ śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvāt śabdatvavad iti. ubhayoḥ samśaya-hetutvād dvāv apy etāv eko 'naikāntikaḥ samudītāv eva.* (NPr 4.21–5.2). Neither of the reasons applied for proving contradictory results, taken individually, violate any of the required three conditions (*trairūpya*) of a valid reason for their respective propositions.

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